The sources of "knowledge," for Hsün-tzu, came from the realities in objective existence. He took the impressions of these objectively existent realities as his basis of knowledge.

The study analyzes the influential factors of consumers’ willingness to purchase gray-market smartphones by considering the model of novelty seeking, status consumption, integrity, and perceived risk. Attitude toward counterfeit is used as mediation in the model. The causalities in the model of problematic willingness of consumer to purchase gray-market smartphones are hypothesized. A total sample of 350 respondents with 238 effective samples is collected by interviewing with questionnaires at the service counters of telecommunications operators. Structure equation modeling (SEM) is adopted (...) in the analysis. Consumers’ attitude toward counterfeit goods is found to be positively related to the willingness of consumers to purchase gray-market smartphones, but perceived risk is negatively related to consumers’ willingness to purchase. As for personality constructs, integrity and status consumption are found to be negatively related to consumers’ attitude toward counterfeit goods, but novelty seeking is positively related to the attitude. Further, managerial implications for branded smartphone manufacturers and telecommunications regulators are provided by the research. (shrink)

This paper gives a definition of self-reference on the basis of the dependence relation given by Leitgeb (2005), and the dependence digraph by Beringer & Schindler (2015). Unlike the usual discussion about self-reference of paradoxes centering around Yablo's paradox and its variants, I focus on the paradoxes of finitary characteristic, which are given again by use of Leitgeb's dependence relation. They are called 'locally finite paradoxes', satisfying that any sentence in these paradoxes can depend on finitely many sentences. I prove (...) that all locally finite paradoxes are self-referential in the sense that there is a directed cycle in their dependence digraphs. This paper also studies the 'circularity dependence' of paradoxes, which was introduced by Hsiung (2014). I prove that the locally finite paradoxes have circularity dependence in the sense that they are paradoxical only in the digraph containing a proper cycle. The proofs of the two results are based directly on König's infinity lemma. In contrast, this paper also shows that Yablo's paradox and its nested variant are non-self-referential, and neither McGee's paradox nor the omega-cycle liar paradox has circularity dependence. (shrink)

Tarski's theorem essentially says that the Liar paradox is paradoxical in the minimal reflexive frame. We generalise this result to the Liar-like paradox $\lambda^\alpha$ for all ordinal $\alpha\geq 1$. The main result is that for any positive integer $n = 2^i(2j+1)$, the paradox $\lambda^n$ is paradoxical in a frame iff this frame contains at least a cycle the depth of which is not divisible by $2^{i+1}$; and for any ordinal $\alpha \geq \omega$, the paradox $\lambda^\alpha$ is paradoxical in a frame (...) iff this frame contains at least an infinite walk which has an arbitrarily large depth. We thus get that $\lambda^n$ has a degree of paradoxicality no more than $\lambda^m$ iff the multiplicity of 2 in the (unique) prime factorisation of $n$ is no more than that in the prime factorisation of $m$; and all tranfinite $\lambda^\alpha$ has the same degree of paradoxcality but has a higher degree of paradoxicality than any $\lambda^n$. (shrink)

This article is a lecture note I wrote for my philosophy of mathematics course. Its main task is to explain the main ideas of Gupta's acceptable model proposed in his paper [J. Philos. Logic 11(1), 1–60, 1982]. I aim to provide detailed information on a result established by Gupta. On the one hand, I hope this explanation can be helpful for those who are learning Gupta's acceptable model, and on the other hand, I also hope to provide a guide for (...) beginners to interpret literature. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On (Im)Patient MessianismMarx, Levinas, and DerridaChung-Hsiung Lai (bio)In the past few decades a group of well-known thinkers and rising-star scholars within the field of continental philosophy have come together to rethink what “the messianic” might mean. From Levinas’s reading of the Talmud and Franz Rosenzweig, and Derrida’s work on Marx and Levinas, to Agamben’s reading of Benjamin and Saint Paul, and Žižek’s work on Saint Paul and Derrida, (...) among others, it is now possible to detect what Arthur Bradley and Paul Fletcher call “a messianic turn” in continental thought. To contribute to this ongoing “messianism” dialogue, this chapter aims to examine what could be termed “(im) patient messianism,” as illustrated in the writings of Marx, Levinas, and Derrida. Although these three philosophers are of Jewish decent (and all of them inherited the concept of Jewish messianism), they develop different, and yet intersecting, messianisms in their philosophies. While Marx’s political philosophy demands an impatient messianism entailing an impending apocalypse intended to achieve social justice, Levinas’s ethical messianism requires absolute patience to pursue justice for the Other in infinity. Resorting to both Levinasian ethics and Marxist politics, Derrida’s spectral (im)patient messianism attempts to [End Page 59] demonstrate the possibility of moving from the ethical to the political without returning to the mire of either ontology or theology. Nevertheless, all three thinkers have problems associated with their messianic beliefs. Simplifying to the extreme, I define (im)patient messianism as the dynamic of a three-dimensional humanism that will be explained in the conclusion after the analysis of (im)patient messianism in the works of the three messianic thinkers.Jewish Messianism and the Messianic Now“What is the messianic? Where does it come from? And why speak of the messianic now? It is, on the face of it, difficult to imagine anything less contemporary — more untimely — than talk of Messiahs, redeemers, chosen people, last judgement.... Yet, paradoxically, it might be precisely this radical sense of untimeliness — of ever becoming ‘timely’ or happening ‘now’ — that represents the messianic’s greatest value of our time, to ‘now-time.’... In other words, the messianic now might actually be something that enables us to think, write and perhaps even judge our ‘now’ otherwise.”1The word Messiah is derived from the Hebrew mashah (“the anointed”) and refers to an eschatological redeemer, a savior, of a group of people. In Difficult Freedom, Levinas points out “messianism in the strong sense of the term has been compromised in the Jewish consciousness since Emancipation, ever since Jews participated in world history” (DF 96). In “Toward an Understanding of the Messianic Idea in Judaism,” Gershom Scholem also claims that “Judaism, in all its forms and manifestations, has always maintained a concept of redemption as an event which takes place publicly, on the stage of history and within the community.”2 Messianism appears “as a living force in the world of Judaism.”3 In truth, the idea of messianism originated in Judaism and is also used in the other Abrahamic religions, namely Christianity and Islam. According to Jewish eschatology, the Messiah is a king or High Priest, traditionally anointed with holy oil to be the ruler of God’s Kingdom. After a series of wars and disasters, [End Page 60] God will send the Messiah to redeem the Jewish people and the world, taking the Jews back to Israel and rebuilding Jerusalem. Specifically, this future Jewish Messiah is thought to be a human leader,4 physically descended from the paternal Davidic line through King David5 and King Solomon,6 who will usher in the Messianic Age of peace for Israel and all the nations of the world. At this time, enemies will become friends, the wicked will abandon evil and do good, so the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the child shall play with the beasts.7Since the Jews have suffered thousands of years of persecution and diaspora, the arrival of the Messiah has become an important concept in their eschatology and living tradition. The messianic is actually a matter of promise, advent, waiting, hope, and redemption. Hence, it... (shrink)

Background: Ethical dilemmas are an integral part of medicine. Whether physicians actually feel that they have made ethically problematic treatment decisions or choices in their work is largely unknown. Identifying physicians with ethical problems, and the types of problems and underlying factors, might benefit organisational and educational efforts to help physicians solve ethical dilemmas in a constructive way. We investigated how the frequency and types of ethically difficult treatment decisions vary by specialty.Method: A mail survey of all non-retired Finnish physicians (...) was conducted in 2004. Of those who had made any ethically problematic treatment decisions, the types of decisions and reasons given for these decisions were asked for. Factor analysis was used to investigate clustering of ethically problematic treatment decisions, and logistic regression to investigate the effect of specialty, adjusted for age and gender.Results: Psychiatrists experienced ethically problematic treatment decisions most frequently, followed by pulmonologists, internists and neurologists. Problems were reported least often by pathologists, laboratory physicians and ophthalmologists. Overtreatment was more common than undertreatment in most specialties, with the exception of psychiatrists who emphasised undertreatment and patient rights issues.Conclusion: Physicians of different specialties differ significantly regarding frequency and types of ethically problematic treatment decisions they have made. Psychiatrists differ from all other specialists in reporting more undertreatment and patient rights issues. Experiencing ethically problematic decisions might affect the quality of care and physician well-being in many ways. The findings could be useful for both under- and postgraduate ethics education. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper is about the problem of the moral responsibility resting on any person to form rational beliefs about, and moral attitudes towards, the deterrent threat of mutual assured destruction (MAD), which still lies behind the graduated nuclear response strategies now more fashionably discussed by military experts. The problem is to decide what kinds of reasons there are, and how to arrive in the light of them at determinate conclusions about deterrence and unilateral disarmament. Consequential arguments would be powerful, (...) if only they were determinate; but not only do they not point conclusively to one strategy rather than another, there is not even sufficient reason for accepting one rather than another of the competing optimising criteria by which the strategies might be assessed. So the reasons of other kinds against forming a conditional intention to retaliate with a massive second strike could be conclusive, if retaliation itself could do no (consequential) good, and if, as is claimed, the conditional intention could not be simulated. To form such an intention is held to be contrary to core values of a humane, rationalist culture. To assent to a nuclear retaliatory strike would do violence to the moral nature of anyone participating in such a culture, and to form an intention to make (or condone) such a strike would be a corruption of such a nature. So too would condoning the fostering of such an intention in others, as a way of making the retaliatory intention credible. The author accordingly considers this argument against MAD, and for unilateral nuclear disarmament, sufficient, given the inadequacy of the consequential arguments, while acknowledging that this might involve great sacrifice. The paper concludes, however, by considering whether anyone can reject nuclear deterrence who also believes that resistance to Nazism in 1939 was justified, given the then prevailing belief that the war might be massively destructive. The author holds that there is no inconsistency in both supporting resistance to evil, even at risk of total destruction, and in refusing to form or condone a conditional intention to do equivalent but pointless evil in order to make a threat credible. (shrink)

General semantics and the cold war mentality, by S. I. Hayakawa.--The talking tribes, by W. Johnson.--On a certain sort of disagreement, by I. J. Lee.--Serial communication of information in organizations, by W. V. Haney.--The cultural roots of bragmatics, by C. M. Babcock.--Images of the consumer's mind on and off Madison Avenue, by M. Rokeach.--Semantics and sexuality, by S. I. Hayakawa.--The magic word in Nazi persuasion, by H. A. Bosmajian.--Freedom and commitment, by C. R. Rogers.--Bibliography (p. 63).

I SHALL develop, in this article, certain distinctions suggested by recent contributions to the philosophical discussion of punishment, which help to clarify the issues involved. Having separated out what I consider the four central philosophical questions, I shall suggest an approach to them, which, while mainly utilitarian, takes due account, I believe, of the retributivist case where it is strongest, and meets the main retributivist objections.

1. Prolegomena. Provlēmata gnōsiologias.

Издание содержит: История исследования творчества в психологии; Феноменология творческой личности.